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About
The Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment (CCSI), a 
joint center of Columbia Law School and the Earth Institute 
at Columbia University, is the only university-based applied 
research center and forum dedicated to the study, practice, and 
discussion of sustainable international investment. 
Executive Summary
This submission seeks to respond to challenges associated 
with implementing, and auditing for compliance with, three 
aspects of Bonsucro’s proposed Production Standard V5 (“the 
Draft Standard”) and proposes a concrete solution that will 
complement Bonsucro operators’ efforts to more effectively 
meet that Standard in practice.1 
Despite some concerning erosions of inclusive approaches 
found in the previous version,2 the Draft Standard sets out 
directives, some binding and others not,3 for operators to: 
(1) Obtain the free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) 
of Indigenous and traditional communities when 
establishing or expanding operations4 and when such 
communities relinquish any land rights;5 
(2) Implement transparent and participatory processes 
to assess, monitor, and evaluate the environmental 
and social impacts of new and existing projects;6 and 
(3) Establish accessible dispute resolution and grievance 
mechanisms that allow communities to raise and 
resolve problems with the operator.7 
These directives indicate a critical need to protect the human 
rights, livelihoods, and priorities of local communities by 
enabling them to meaningfully participate in and influence 
decision-making throughout the life of a sugarcane project. 
Yet meaningful community participation in relevant decision-
making processes is often unachievable without community 
access to technical support and empowerment—from 
paralegals, lawyers, scientists, among other support providers. 
Communities’ need for support in the context of investment 
has been acknowledged by the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights8 and the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm 
Oil (RSPO),9 as well as experts within the United Nations10 and 
World Bank.11 
Facilitating affected communities’ access to technical support 
also benefits private sector organizations. Specifically, a lack of 
community support increases the risk of grievances and conflict, 
stemming from issues such as mismatched expectations, 
inadequate consultation and participation opportunities for 
communities, or onerous community-company agreements.12 A 
recent study focusing on the sugarcane sector in Kenya, Malawi, 
and Tanzania found that land-related disputes in those countries 
often cause long delays, with nearly half of these disputes 
lasting over 10 years.13 In addition to these delays, local disputes 
and conflict can tarnish reputations and shut entire projects 
down. In one case, these disputes risked costing a sugarcane 
operation in Malawi as much as US$ 101 million in foregone 
revenue, which would reduce its net present value by up to 
110%.14 More generally, in a 2018 USAID investor survey, more 
than 50% of land-based investment companies surveyed cited 
a recent increase in disputes over local community access to 
resources and land.15 Successful mitigation strategies reportedly 
used by companies included active community engagement 
and the establishment of effective grievance mechanisms;16 
such processes are more likely to be effectively navigated by 
communities who can access relevant technical support. 
2 | COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT
CCSI Submission 
One challenge in the facilitation of community access to support 
is the question of who pays for that support. In contrast to 
operators of large mills and of large-scale sugarcane plantations, 
which can generally afford the expertise needed to pursue 
investments, local communities often struggle to secure funding 
needed to access technical support. To meet this funding gap, 
we propose that Bonsucro require operators to make financial 
contributions to a Basket Fund for Responsible Investment. By 
increasing community access to technical support, a Basket 
Fund would help operators to more effectively meet Bonsucro’s 
standards with regard to FPIC and community participation in 
decision-making, impact assessment and monitoring, as well as 
dispute resolution and grievance mechanisms. 
Section 1. Our Suggested Solution: a Basket Fund 
for Responsible Investment
A Basket Fund for Responsible Investment refers to an 
independently administered fund that receives financial 
contributions from multiple sources and then makes grants to 
pay for technical support for investment-affected communities. 
In this case, financial contributors would include Bonsucro 
operators whose revenues exceed a certain threshold, 
potentially alongside such operators’ financiers, investors, large-
scale suppliers, and customers, among others. By diversifying 
its sources of funding, a Basket Fund can achieve greater 
independence of community support, decoupling each financial 
contribution to the Basket Fund from the decision-making 
process on who will receive the funding. This minimizes the 
risk of those financial contributions exacerbating the operator’s 
actual or perceived undue influence over the community or 
support provider. 
Requiring operators to make regular financial contributions to 
a Basket Fund for Responsible Investment would also assist 
Bonsucro to more effectively monitor operator compliance with 
its Production Standard. Payments from operators into a Basket 
Fund would be an easily auditable indicator to help Bonsucro 
measure, and help operators demonstrate, operator compliance 
with the elements of Bonsucro’s standards on informed and 
empowered community participation in investment-related 
decision-making processes. 
While a Basket Fund for Responsible Investment is a relatively 
novel solution, it is also feasible. Different types of basket funds 
have already been established by a multi-stakeholder initiative 
(MSI)17 and by industry actors,18 and mandatory investor 
contributions to a basket fund for community legal assistance is 
even included in Sierra Leone’s National Land Policy,19 indicating 
host government openness to such a solution.
Regular financial contributions by operators to a Basket 
Fund for Responsible Investment can facilitate operator 
compliance with the Draft Standard’s requirements for FPIC 
and appropriate community participation in decision-making, 
impact assessment and monitoring, and dispute resolution and 
grievance mechanisms. The Draft Standard should, therefore, 
incorporate one of the three options below to require operators 
to make regular financial contributions for the financing of 
independent support to affected communities. In each case, 
the Draft Standard should include core indicators and/or 
guidance that explicitly mention Basket Fund contributions as 
one necessary, but not in itself sufficient, measure operators 
must take towards the implementation of the Draft Standard’s 
ultimate requirements for FPIC and community participation 
in decision-making, impact assessment and monitoring, and 
dispute resolution and grievance mechanisms.
Option 1. Bonsucro could facilitate the establishment of a 
Basket Fund for Responsible Investment, with appropriate 
arrangements for independent and autonomous 
operation, and the Draft Standard could require relevant 
operators to make financial contributions into it. 
 
Option 2. The Draft Standard could require relevant 
Bonsucro operators to make financial contributions into 
an appropriate external Basket Fund where such a  
fund exists. 
 
Option 3. The Draft Standard could impose a more general 
requirement for relevant Bonsucro operators to make 
financial contributions towards independent community 
support, in ways that do not jeopardize the independence 
of that support. This would include contributions to a 
Basket Fund, among other approaches, but would not 
usually include the operator directly paying the support 
provider, as doing so introduces unacceptable risks of 
perceived or actual undue influence.20
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Section 1.1. FPIC and Community Participation in Decision-
Making
The Draft Standard should explicitly require operators to 
make financial contributions to a Basket Fund for Responsible 
Investment as a part of their efforts to meet the Draft Standard’s 
requirement21 to obtain the free, prior and informed consent 
(FPIC) of Indigenous and traditional communities.22 
FPIC refers to the right of a community or people to participate 
in decision-making on issues relevant to their well-being and to 
give or withhold consent to any project or policy that would affect 
them or their lands or resources. The components of FPIC include: 
1. Free: Community members give or withhold consent 
voluntarily, without coercion, intimidation,  
or manipulation. 
2. Prior: Consent is obtained well before each stage 
of project authorization, and is actively sought and 
maintained on an ongoing basis throughout the life of 
a project.23 This means that while the Draft Standard 
expressly calls for FPIC “before any operations are 
established or expanded,” the invocation of the FPIC 
standard actually entails ongoing, iterative FPIC 
processes throughout the life of the sugarcane project. 
3. Informed: Community members access, understand, 
and deliberate on all relevant project information 
before giving or withholding consent. 
4. Consent: Community decisions to agree, refuse, or offer 
conditional consent to projects or activities that affect 
their land or resources are respected.
It will often not be possible to obtain a community’s FPIC if 
community members do not have access to the technical 
support and skill development needed to access and understand 
information about the project, deliberate internally, navigate 
processes to influence decision-making, and, where they are 
willing to grant actual or conditional consent, negotiate the terms 
of such consent. For example, a recent decision by the Roundtable 
on Sustainable Palm Oil’s Complaints Panel found an agribusiness 
plantation operator in breach of applicable requirements to obtain 
the FPIC of an affected community during community-company 
negotiations in part because of a likely lack of legal support. In 
particular, the Complaints Panel found that “[t]he element of 
“informed” [in the requirement to obtain free, prior and informed 
consent] was not complied with as the investigation found the 
community members had very limited information prior to the 
signing of the MoU” and that “[t]he limited understandings of the 
provisions of the MoU found among the community members […] 
further suggests that no legal advice was received to interpret the 
rather legal language used in the MoU.”24
Such support to communities requires funding. While some 
companies have sought to directly finance technical support 
to communities,25 this approach brings a considerable risk 
of introducing actual or perceived undue influence over 
community beneficiaries. One solution to this challenge is a 
Basket Fund that receives financial contributions from Bonsucro 
operators and then independently grants funding for technical 
support to communities in relation to a relevant sugarcane 
production process.
Making contributions to a Basket Fund can help operators 
more effectively meet Bonsucro’s standards while also 
strengthening their local relationships and improving their 
decision-making processes. Basket funds lead to more prepared 
and communicative communities, helping operators to better 
understand and incorporate community perspectives into project 
design and decisions and reducing the risks of costly conflict. 
MSIs focusing on sustainable production have also experienced 
a number of challenges in ensuring operator compliance with 
their standards. For example, in one study, MSI auditors were 
found to have a “flawed” and “weak” understanding of the 
applicable MSI standard, particularly relating to social criteria 
like FPIC and customary rights of affected communities;26 this 
resulted in “faulty” assessments and companies proceeding 
with their investments despite being in “serious violation” of 
FPIC and High Conservation Value (HCV) requirements.27 While 
never sufficient in itself to prove that FPIC has been obtained, 
proof of each operator’s financial contributions to a Basket Fund 
would be an easily auditable indicator of concrete actions taken 
by the operator as part of broader efforts to obtain the FPIC of 
affected communities, thus helping Bonsucro to track operator 
commitment to, and compliance with, the Bonsucro Standard.
Section 1.2. Impact Assessment and Monitoring 
The Draft Standard should explicitly require operators to 
make financial contributions to a Basket Fund for Responsible 
Investment as a part of their efforts to meet the Draft 
Standard’s requirement of inclusive impact assessment and 
monitoring processes. 28
The Draft Standard requires that new projects and greenfield 
expansions be covered by environmental and social impact 
assessments (ESIAs). The guidance to the core indicator for 
this requirement states that the ESIA “shall start prior to the 
formulation phase of a project, focus on significant issues 
and identify stakeholders to involve them, consider impacts 
on individuals with special consideration for vulnerable ones, 
and provide information on possible alternative or appropriate 
mitigation measures.”29 It also notes that ESIA-related decisions 
“shall be based on meaningful engagement with affected 
stakeholders (as defined by OECD), monitored and evaluated.”30
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The Draft Standard’s ESIA requirement should be interpreted to 
incorporate the FPIC requirements included in other parts of the 
Draft Standard. This is consistent with the Inter-American Court 
on Human Rights, which has held that:
The purpose of ESIAs is not only to have some objective 
measure of such possible impact on the land and 
the people, but also […] to ‘ensure that members of 
the [affected community] are aware of possible risks, 
including environmental and health risks, in order that the 
proposed development or investment plan is accepted 
knowingly and voluntarily’.31
The necessary incorporation of FPIC into impact assessment 
requirements is also echoed by legal expert Dr. Cathal Doyle, 
who posits that for impact assessments to be meaningful, 
they “must be conducted at each stage in the decision-making 
process where FPIC is required and provide an effective 
participatory mechanism through which the nature and severity 
of any potential limitations on indigenous peoples’ rights are 
determined by, or in conjunction with, the concerned peoples.”32 
In addition, the above interpretation is consistent with the 
iterative nature of the Draft Standard’s FPIC requirement. 
As noted above, while the Draft Standard identifies FPIC as 
a necessary component to begin a sugarcane project, FPIC 
cannot be obtained without ongoing, iterative processes for 
consultation and the maintenance of consent throughout 
the lifecycle of a project. This is consistent with the OECD’s 
Guidance for Meaningful Stakeholder Engagement,  itself a 
point of reference within the Draft Standard’s requirement for 
ESIA,33 which defines “meaningful stakeholder engagement” 
as “ongoing engagement with stakeholders that is two-way, 
conducted in good faith and responsive.”34 
As described under Section 1.1, above, FPIC-compliant ESIA 
process incorporating meaningful stakeholder engagement can 
best be achieved by financing technical support to each affected 
community. Community access to such technical expertise 
and support would be facilitated by a requirement for relevant 
operators to make regular contributions to a Basket Fund. 
Finally, contributions to a Basket Fund for Responsible 
Investment can help operationalize meaningful and empowered 
community participation in the monitoring of an operator’s 
obligations and project impacts.35 Involving communities in 
monitoring can help create norms and pressure for greater 
compliance with negotiated agreements, applicable laws, and 
Bonsucro’s standards. Yet such monitoring efforts generally 
require a degree of technical knowledge and resources; for 
example, the Draft Standard instructs mills to measure dissolved 
oxygen levels in receiving streams by utilizing a very specific 
technical method.36 Community access to such technical 
expertise would be facilitated by a requirement for relevant 
operators to make regular contributions to a Basket Fund. 
Section 1.3. Dispute Resolution and Grievance Mechanisms 
The Draft Standard should explicitly require operators to 
make financial contributions to a Basket Fund for Responsible 
Investment as a part of their efforts to meet the Draft Standard’s 
requirement that operators have in place a grievance mechanism 
that is compliant with the United Nations Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights (UNGPs).37 
Criteria 1.3 requires the grievance mechanism to be accessible 
to all parties, adapted for local use, “mutually agreed on,” and 
allow for “complainants to choose individuals or groups to 
support them and/or act as observers.” Allowing for communities 
to choose the people to support them is meaningless without 
also making sure the necessary funds are available, in an 
independent manner, for the community to procure such 
support. Rather than relying on operators to directly finance 
third party experts, which, as described above, can introduce 
risks of perceived or actual undue influence over communities, 
the Draft Standard should require operators to make financial 
contributions to a Basket Fund for Responsible Investment that 
then finances technical support for affected communities.
The Draft Standard’s requirement that grievance mechanisms 
are consistent with the expectations of the UNGPs includes 
requirements that non-judicial grievance mechanisms be 
“equitable” and “accessible,” among other characteristics. The 
UNGPs explain that to be equitable, grievance mechanisms must 
ensure aggrieved parties have “reasonable access to sources 
of information, advice and expertise necessary to engage in a 
grievance process on fair, informed and respectful terms.”38 
Similarly, being “accessible” entails “providing adequate 
assistance for those who may face barriers to access.”39 The 
UNGPs also recognize that power imbalances often exist 
between businesses and affected stakeholders in the context 
of a dispute, and the resulting need for financial resources to 
facilitate the community access to “information and expert 
resources.”40 Requiring such funding to be paid by operators 
into a Basket Fund for Responsible Investment is, therefore, a 
promising way to effectively comply with the Draft Standard’s 
requirement for a UNGP-compliant grievance mechanism. 
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Section 2. Troubling Changes in Draft Production 
Standard V5
The following table sets out some concerning features with the 
Draft Standard solely as it relates to the sub-topics of this brief, 
namely: FPIC and community participation in decision-making; 
impact assessment and monitoring; and dispute resolution and 
grievance mechanisms. It should not be taken as an exhaustive 
review of the Draft Standard.
FPIC and Consultation
Previous Standard Language Draft Production Standard V5 Discussion of Shortcomings
 Criterion 5.7: “For greenfield 
expansion or new sugarcane 
projects, to ensure transparent, 
consultative and participatory 
processes that address 
cumulative and induced effects 
via an environmental and social 
impact assessment”
Core Indicator 1.1.2 (Notes): The 
operator shall have an identification, 
prioritization and engagement plan 
with interested and affected parties 
(i.e. internal, external, directly, 
indirectly impacted, and vulnerable 
stakeholders, as well as indigenous, 
tribal and traditional communities). 
The plan shall be revised at least 
annually. 
(Guidance): The process of 
engaging with indigenous and 
tribal communities shall take into 
consideration ILO Convention 
169, guaranteeing indigenous 
peoples the right to free, prior and 
informed consent consultation and 
guaranteeing good faith.
The elimination of express 
requirements and guidance 
for operators to conduct 
“transparent, consultative 
and participatory processes 
with all relevant stakeholders” 
throughout the lifecycle of a 
project is concerning. While FPIC 
is still required in Indicator 1.2.3, 
the removal of a focus on process 
risks encouraging operators to 
take an “extractive” approach 
to obtaining consent, rather 
than emphasizing the rights of 
affected community members to 
be informed and to participate in 
and influence decisions regarding 
the project. The narrowing of 
FPIC rights to Indigenous and 
tribal communities in 1.1.2 is also 
inconsistent with other mentions 
of FPIC in the Draft Standard and 
risks limiting the participation of 
affected communities that are not 
Indigenous or tribal. 
Criterion 5.8: “To ensure active 
engagement and transparent, 
consultative and participatory 
processes with all relevant 
stakeholders”
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Impact Assessment and Participatory Monitoring
 Previous Standard Language Draft Production Standard V5 Discussion of Shortcomings
Criterion 5.7: “For greenfield expansion or new 
sugarcane projects, to ensure transparent, 
consultative and participatory processes that address 
cumulative and induced effects via an environmental 
and social impact assessment”
Core Indicator 4.1.6 (Guidance): An 
ESIA process shall start prior to the 
formulation phase of a project, focus 
on significant issues and identify 
stakeholders to involve them, consider 
impacts on individuals with special 
consideration for vulnerable ones, 
and provide information on possible 
alternative or appropriate mitigation 
measures. Decisions shall be based on 
meaningful engagement with affected 
stakeholders (as defined by OECD), 
monitored and evaluated.
The removal of express 
mentions of FPIC from ESIA 
requirements implies an 
intention to avoid the FPIC 
standard. We submit (in 
section 1.2, above) that ESIA 
requirements should still be 
interpreted to incorporate an 
FPIC requirement.
Core Indicator 5.7.1 (Notes): “ESIA process shall 
start prior the formulation phase of a project, focus 
on significant issues and involve key stakeholders 
to identify them, provide information on possible 
alternative or appropriate mitigation measures for 
making decision based on free prior informed consent 
(FPIC) process, monitor and evaluate implemented 
measures.”
Core Indicator 4.1.3 (Notes): The EIMP addresses 
key environmental issues: biodiversity, ecosystem 
services, soil, water, air, climate change, use of crop 
protection chemicals, use of artificial fertilisers, cane 
burning and noise. The plan shall be implemented 
and progress monitored. A summary of the EIMP 
shall be made available to relevant stakeholders. 
Core Indicator 1.1.4: “At minimum, 
the impact assessment must cover 
the core indicators of the Standard 
including actual and potential impacts 
of the operation on the environment, 
workforce, and communities.”
Grievance Mechanisms and Dispute Resolution
 Previous Standard Language Draft Production Standard V5 Discussion of Shortcomings
Indicator 5.8.1 (Notes): “Ensure 
that when dispute, grievances 
and conflicts arise, the operator 
acts appropriately to resolve them 
through negotiated agreement 
between parties based on Free, Prior 
and Informed Consent”
Indicator 1.3.1: “operator must 
have in place a mutually agreed 
on and documented grievance 
mechanism that meets the 
expectations laid out in the UN 
Guiding Principles for Business 
and Human Rights”
While the framing of grievance mechanism 
requirements in the context of the UN Guiding 
Principles is helpful, the elimination of guidance 
for operators to establish an FPIC-compliant 
negotiated agreement with complainants following 
the resolution of such a mechanism is a missed 
opportunity to reiterate the iterative nature of the 
FPIC requirement. This is especially important, given 
that post-dispute resolution agreements can be an 
important tool for communities and community 
members to subsequently hold operators to account 
and for regulating and facilitating communication 
between communities and operators, including 
establishing processes which can enable 
communities to participate in and influence 
decision-making moving forward. In addition, the 
design and establishment of the mechanism itself 
should be FPIC-compliant.
Indicator 5.8.2: “Percentage of 
projects involving multi stakeholders 
where agreement has been reached 
by consensus driven process based 
on Free, Prior and Informed Consent”
No equivalent
Indicator 5.8.2 (Notes): “Negotiated 
agreement shall be based on Free 
Prior Informed Consent. Evidence of 
negotiated agreements shall to be 
demonstrated.”
No equivalent
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